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Abstract
This paper extends the theory of legal cartels to aﬃliated private value and
common value environments, and applies the theory to explain joint bidding
patterns in U.S. federal government oﬀshore oil and gas lease auctions. We
show that eﬃcient collusion is always possible in private value environments,
but may not be in common value environments. In the latter case, fear of the
winner’s curse can cause bidders not to bid, which leads to ineﬃcient trade.
Buyers with high signals may be better oﬀ if no one colludes. The bid data
is consistent with oil and gas leases being common value assets, and with the
prediction that the winner’s curse can prevent rings from forming on marginal
tracts.
1 Introduction
Collusion in an auction market occurs when a group of bidders take actions to limit
competition among themselves. Colluding bidders are often called a ring, which can
include all of the bidders or some subset. There is evidence of collusion in many
auction markets. Examples include highway construction contracts (Porter and Zona
[27], school milk delivery (Pesendorfer [25], Porter and Zona [28]), and timber auctions
(Baldwin et al.[3]). Collusion is not too surprising since noncooperative behavior
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1is not jointly optimal for bidders. They are collectively better oﬀ colluding and
transferring gains from trade from the seller to the ring. The problems that a ring
faces in dividing the collusive surplus are detection by authorities or by the seller,
internal enforcement, entry, and private information about the gains from trade.
Legal rings do not have to worry as much about detection or enforcement. The
main obstacle that they face is oﬀering incentives to elicit each member’s private
information about the gains to trade. This raises the following question: can a legal
ring collude eﬃciently and still oﬀer its members expected payoﬀs that exceed what
they can earn if the ring does not operate?
The question has been studied using the tools of mechanism design for auctions of
private value assets with independent signals. Private value assets are assets where
each buyer’s valuation depends only upon her own information. Examples include
highway construction contracts where the variation in the buyers’ valuations is due to
idiosyncratic diﬀerences in costs. The conclusion of the literature is that bidding rings
can collude eﬃciently and make their members better oﬀ. Our objective in this paper
is to study ring formation in ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auctions of private value assets
with aﬃliated signals and common value assets. Common value assets are assets
where each buyer’s valuation depends upon the information of all of the buyers. The
canonical example of such assets are oil and gas leases. The value of the oil and gas
deposit on a tract is common to all bidders, even though they may have diﬀerent
information about the size of the deposit and diﬀerent development costs.1
The motivation for our study is to explain the incidence of joint bidding in U.S.
federal auctions of oil and gas leases in the Outer Continental Shelf oﬀ the coasts of
Louisiana and Texas during the period 1954 to 1970, inclusive. Joint ventures were
legal for all ﬁrms prior to 1976 and enforced by binding contracts,2 so oil ﬁrms were
free to design the collusive agreements optimally. They also did not have to worry
about entry. The joint bidding agreements were typically struck shortly before the
sale date, which made it diﬃcult for ﬁrms who had not invested in seismic surveys
to react in time. The gain from reduced competition was also high. The average
winning bid in wildcat auctions for the period 1954-79 was 12.8 million dollars (in
1982 dollars). Despite the legality of joint bids, joint bids among the twelve largest
bidders, who accounted for 73.8% of all bids, represented only 18.6% of total bids
submitted by these bidders. Why was the incidence of joint bidding so low?
The low incidence is particularly puzzling since oil and gas leases are common
value assets. Buyers are more likely to achieve a consensus on the value of a common
1See Hendricks, Pinkse and Porter [15] for evidence that supports the claim that oil and gas
leases are common value assets.
2In late 1975, concerns over bidding collusion caused Congress to pass legislation prohibiting the
eight largest private oil ﬁrms (Exxon, Gulf, Mobil, Shell, Standard Oil of California, Standard Oil
of Indiana, Texaco, and British Petroleum) from bidding jointly on federal leases on the OCS.
2value asset. For example, in the case of a pure common value asset, all buyers have the
same valuation given the same information. Buyers in common value auctions also
need to share their information to determine whether the asset is worth acquiring. By
contrast, in private value auctions, each buyer knows whether or not the asset is worth
acquiring but, in common value auctions. Information sharing is especially valuable
in auctions of risky common value assets like oil and gas leases where the buyers needs
to invest after acquiring them. The announced reserve price is relatively small, less
than $100,000, but the cost of drilling an exploratory well is approximately 1.5 million
dollars. The risk of a dry well is high, since only 39% of the tracts receiving bids
in the period 1954-79 were productive (Porter [26]). Thus, the information pooling
in oil and gas auctions substantially increases the collusive surplus. Both of these
factors suggest that establishing a ring should be easier in auctions of common value
assets. Indeed, this is the conventional wisdom. For example, McAfee and McMillan
[22] argue that the reason that they focus on the private values case is because the
optimal ring mechanism in the pure common value case is simple if members can
communicate with each other. Eﬃciency is attained regardless of which member gets
the right to bid in the seller’s auction, so an all-inclusive ring can use some exogenous
method to pick which of its members should win the right and ask each bidder to
report his information. Bidders have no incentive to misrepresent their information,
and the winner can determine on the basis of the pooled information whether the
asset is worth acquiring.
Our main theoretical ﬁnding is that, contrary to conventional wisdom, eﬃcient
collusion is always possible in private value environments but not always possible
in common value environments. The reason is closely related to the phenomenon
known as the “winner’s curse”.3 Fear of the winner’s curse causes buyers to bid less
aggressively, which leads to ineﬃcient trade. It is possible that no one bids even
though at least one of the buyers would be willing to do so if he knew all of the
private signals. By contrast, in the ring, there is no winner’s curse. Each member
knows that, if selected, he will learn the private signals of the other members prior
to the acquisition decision and hence will purchase it if and only if his valuation
conditional on all of the private signals exceeds investment costs. The eﬃciency of
the ring relative to competitive bidding works to the advantage of buyers with low
signals but against a buyer with a high signal. He pays a little less to the seller but
a lot more to the other bidders. By contrast, in private value auctions, ownership
of the asset is always transferred eﬃciently whether bidders collude or not. This is
because each buyer’s willingness to pay depends only upon his own private signal,
3Bulow and Klemperer [4] document a number of similar counterintuitive results that can arise
when bidders bid noncooperatively for common value assets. They show that fear of the winner’s
curse can cause increases in supply, allocation by rationing and exclusion of potential buyers to
increase the prices of common value assets.
3and he bids if and only if his valuation conditional on his signal exceeds investments
costs.
Our theory predicts that oil ﬁrms are unlikely to collude on marginal tracts where
priors are pessimistic and competition is low. We test this prediction. One diﬃculty
in testing this prediction is measuring competition. The decision to bid is endogenous,
because post-sale drilling costs are non-trivial, and the number of bids submitted is
therefore correlated with the inferences ﬁrms draw from their signals. We construct
a measure of the number of potential bidders for a tract from information on the
location of the tracts and which ﬁrms bid in the area. A second diﬃculty is identi-
fying the tracts on which the ring operates. Colluding ﬁrms often bid jointly, which
is observable since the participants had to identify themselves and their shares in
submitting their bid. But solo bidding does not necessarily imply the absence of a
ring. In his testimony to the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law
in February 1976, Darius Gaskins argued that the collusive eﬀects of joint ventures
should not be measured solely in terms of tracts receiving joint bids. The negotiations
to bid jointly could allow partners to coordinate their solo bids. Indeed, our theoret-
ical results suggest that this could be the case. Equal-sharing may be eﬃcient and
incentive compatible in pure common value auctions, but bidders with high signals
may be reluctant to join such a ring. Collusive mechanisms with side payments such
as the ﬁrst-price knockout can mitigate (but not entirely solve) this problem. But
if the ring uses a mechanism like the knockout auction to coordinate bids, then its
presence can be inferred from bidding patterns. We identify rings by their joint bids
and propose a test for identifying the set of tracts on which they operate that exploits
the locational information. We ﬁnd no evidence that joint bidding between a pair of
ﬁrms in one area spills over and aﬀects the likelihood of their bidding against each
other in other areas, as Gaskins hypothesized. This suggests that rings typically bid
jointly and that solo bids were coordinated only in areas where they bid jointly.
Our main empirical ﬁnding is that, based on the incidence of joint bidding, rings
rarely operate on tracts where the number of potential bidders is fewer than ﬁve.
Since the number of potential bidders is highly correlated with the value of the tract,
these are tracts where the risk of dry holes is high and information sharing is valuable.
This evidence supports the claim that oil and gas leases are common value assets and
the prediction that the winner’s curse can prevent rings from forming in common
value auctions.
As mentioned previously, the theoretical literature on collusion in auctions has
focused exclusively on the case of private values with independent signals. Graham
and Marshall [12] analyze collusion in second-price sealed bid and English auctions.
They show that a second-price knockout auction tournament operated by an outside
agent hired by the ring can implement eﬃcient collusion by any subset of ex ante
identical bidders. The mechanism satisﬁes ex ante budget balance but not ex post
4budget balance. Mailath and Zemsky [19] study second-price auctions with heteroge-
nous bidders and establish that eﬃcient collusion by any subset of bidders is possible.
McAfee and McMillan [22] study ﬁrst-price sealed bid auctions and show that, if the
ring includes all bidders, then eﬃcient collusion with ex post budget balancing is pos-
sible but it requires transfers to be paid from the member with the highest valuation
to those with lower valuations. They assume that bidders commit to the ring before
they obtain their private information so that the relevant participation constraints
are ex ante. Cramton and Palfrey [7] study eﬃcient collusion by an all-inclusive ring
in homogenous good industries where ﬁrms have private information about costs.
They characterize conditions under which it is possible for the lowest cost ﬁrm to
produce the monopoly output and bribe the other cartel members not to produce,
under the threat that defection by any one ﬁrm results in either Cournot or Bertrand
competition. They also consider the case of common cost uncertainty and show that
equal-sharing cartels are unlikely to form when the number of ﬁr m si sl a r g e .
Previous empirical studies of joint bidding in OCS auctions by Mead [23], Erickson
and Spann [9], Gaskins and Vann [10], Mead and Sorenson [21], Rockwood [29] and
Gilley et al [11] have estimated reduced form models of the determinants of joint bids.
These authors typically use the government’s estimate of the value of the tract, the
winning bid, and/or the number of bids as a measure of ex ante value of the tract. We
use our measure of the number of potential bidders as a proxy for ex ante perceptions
of value.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the way in which
t h eU . S .g o v e r n m e n ta u c t i o n si t so ﬀshore oil and gas leases and how ﬁrms form joint
ventures. The description motivates our approach of modeling collusion as a problem
of mechanism design. The model is presented in Section 3. We focus on a simple
comparison: the buyers’ expected payoﬀs if none collude versus their expected payoﬀs
if all collude. In Section 4 we identify conditions under which the ﬁrst-price knockout
auction yields payoﬀs that satisfy interim participation constraints and characterize
the set of all incentive compatible, eﬃcient collusive mechanisms for common value
environments with independent signals. In Section 5 we use a parametric example
to identify the conditions under which the all-inclusive ring does not satisfy interim
participation. Coalitions of subsets of bidders, or partial rings, are discussed brieﬂy
in Section 6. In Section 7 we show that the theoretical predictions are consistent
with observed bidding patterns in oﬀshore oil and gas auctions. Section 8 provides
concluding remarks.
52 The Application
T h eU Sg o v e r n m e n th o l d st h em i n e r a lr i g h t st oo ﬀshore lands more than three miles
from the coast, out to the 200 mile limit. Beginning in 1954, the federal government
has transferred production rights on its lands to the private sector by a succession
of lease sales in which hundreds of leases have been auctioned. A wildcat lease sale
is initiated when the Department of Interior (DOI) announces that certain oﬀshore
areas are available for exploration, and nominations are invited as to which tracts
should be oﬀered for sale. A tract is typically a block of 5,000 or 5,760 acres, or half
a block. The number of tracts available in a sale is usually well over one hundred and
tracts are often scattered over several diﬀerent areas. They are sold simultaneously
using a ﬁrst-price, sealed bid auction. The announced reserve price for tracts in our
sample is $15 per acre. Post-sale drilling costs were approximately one to two million
dollars per tract. A participating buyer or consortium of buyers submits a separate
bid on each tract that it has an interest in acquiring. A bid is a dollar ﬁgure, known
as a bonus. At the sale date, DOI opens the envelopes and announces the value of
the bids that have been submitted on each tract and the identities of the bidders.
The ﬁrm or consortium that submits the highest bid on a tract is usually awarded the
tract at a price equal to its bid. In practice, the government could and did reject bids
above the stated minimum price. The rejection rate was less than 10% on wildcat
tracts and usually occurred on marginal tracts receiving only one bid (Porter [26]).
Prior to the wildcat sale, ﬁrms acquire geophysical and geological information
about the tracts. They are not permitted to drill exploratory wells. A geophysical
company is often hired to “shoot” a seismic survey of a large, roughly 50 block area.
The cost of the shoot is approximately $12 million and it is usually shared by several
oil companies. Alternatively, the geophysical company may ﬁnance its own survey,
anticipating that it can sell the report to the oil ﬁrms at a future date. In either
case, the oil companies jointly underwrite the cost of the shoot. After receiving the
data from the shoot, each ﬁrm identiﬁes key geological features that it believes are
evidence of the presence of hydrocarbons. At this point, each ﬁrm typically rejects at
least half of the tracts in the 50 block area. Since the interpretation of seismic data
varies considerably across ﬁrms, they frequently select diﬀerent tracts. Each ﬁrm
then conducts an in-depth evaluation of the tracts it views as promising to determine
whether they are worth bidding for and, if so, how much to bid. In this second stage,
the oil ﬁrms often purchase more data and shoot “inﬁll” or “cross-diagonal” lines
on selected blocks to build a better picture of the substrata. Indeed, the major oil
companies often reserve boat time at the time of joint shoot, anticipating their need
to do follow up shoots. The cost of the information upgrade on the area is between
$500,000 to $1 million. In addition, the ﬁrm must pay for the in-house expertise
required to interpret the geophysical data. The rejection rate in the second stage
6is much lower. Each ﬁrm typically submits bids on 80% of the tracts that it has
scrutinized more closely.
All ﬁrms were allowed to bid jointly prior to 1975 and the joint bidding agreements
were enforced by legally binding contracts. Most of the joint bidding agreements are
sale-speciﬁc, that is, ﬁrms who bid jointly in one sale frequently did not do so in
other sales. The agreements were typically struck after the ﬁrms had invested in the
area-wide seismic studies. The procedure is described by Mobil Oil Corporation in
its testimony submitted on February 19, 1976 to the House of Representatives, Sub-
committee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on the Judiciary.
“The bidding groups are formed under a bidding agreement, a formal
written document executed by all parties prior to any discussions relating
to bonus values. This agreement establishes procedures for arriving at a
joint bid and provides for the protection of each individual company in
the event agreement cannot be reached. The agreement can either cover
t h ee n t i r es a l ea r e ao r ,m o r ec o m m o n l y ,b el i m i t e dt oas p e c i ﬁca r e ao f
mutual interest (AMI) to the companies involved.”
Hendricks and Porter [13] document that equal division is the predominant sharing
rule among the major bidders when they submit joint bids, although not when a major
(or more than one major) bids with smaller partners. Smaller partners tend to have
smaller shares. The agreements did allow ﬁrms to adjust their shares on individual
tracts, possibly to zero, if they could not agree upon a bid. Mobil describes the joint
bidding negotiations as follows:
"Each party suggests the highest amount it is willing to bid. The highest
suggested bid becomes the group bid on that particular tract. At this
point, companies sometimes drop out of the group if they cannot support
the highest suggested bid and no further discussion of bid level on that
particular tract is held in the presence on the non-participating parties.
Any company that is unwilling to join in the highest suggested bid must
drop out. In some instances, a company will take a reduced percentage in
the joint bid rather than drop out."4
To avoid strategic drop outs, the agreement typically required each participant to
oﬀer their partners equal ownership shares if it wins the tract with a bid that is
4A similar description is given by Andrew Stuart in his article on the Baltimore Canyon sale in
the September 11, 1978 issue of Fortune.
7not sanctioned by the ring. This provision eliminated the incentive participants may
otherwise have had to pretend disinterest in a tract and then outbid the ring. As a
result, members either shared in the bids submitted by the ring on tracts within the
AMI or they did not bid.
The above description establishes several important facts that are relevant to
our model. First, the joint venture agreements are negotiated after the ﬁrms have
acquired their private information about the tracts. Second, the joint venture agree-
ments cover blocks of tracts, typically 25 to 50 tracts, and not individual tracts.
Third, if the ﬁrms decide to participate in the joint venture, they know that they are
legally committed to jointly evaluate tracts in the AMI and to coordinate their bids
a c c o r d i n gt ot h em e c h a n i s ms p e c i ﬁed in the agreement. And fourth, the allocation
decisions are made on a tract-by-tract basis.
3 The Model
We model collusion as a problem in mechanism design. Firms can make binding
commitments to the ring, and side payments are feasible. The collusive mechanism
determines which members get the exclusive right to bid on which tracts, and the
transfers among them. We restrict attention to mechanisms that allocate each tract
on the basis of the information reported on that tract. The restriction rules out mech-
anisms that bundle tracts, as well as mechanisms such as the rank-order mechanism
studied by Pesendorfer [25] that allocates individual tracts on the basis of informa-
tion reported on other tracts. The implicit assumption is that buyers have to collude
eﬃciently on each tract in order to collude eﬃciently on the block of tracts.5
The seller sells the representative tract using a ﬁrst-price sealed bid auction with
a pre-announced reserve price. Let r denote the sum of the reserve price and post-sale
investment. There are n buyers, labelled i =1 ,..,n.T oq u a l i f ya sab u y e r ,aﬁrm has
to invest in a survey of the area. The number and identities of the buyers are assumed
to be common knowledge.6 Thus, investment in the area-wide survey establishes a
ﬁrm as a serious bidder.
We denote buyer i’s private signal on the representative tract by Si.T h es i g n a l s
are real-valued and their support normalized to be the unit interval. Let V denote
the unknown component that is common to both buyers’ valuations.
5Characterizing eﬃcient collusion in multiple object auctions is a research program unto itself
and beyond the scope of this paper. Jackson and Sonnenschein [16] provide an interesting charac-
terization of eﬃcient mechanisms for environments in which number of objects is large.
6When ﬁrms hire a geophysical survey company to shoot the area, disagreements among them
about the design of the shoot sometimes makes it necessary for them to communicate directly with
each other. They also frequently reveal themselves as serious bidders when they engage in “inﬁll”
surveys.
8Assumption 1: (V,S1,..,Sn) are aﬃliated and symmetric in (S1,..,S n).
Let F denote the cumulative distribution function of (V,S1,..,Sn) with support [v,v]×
[0,1]n. I ti sa s s u m e dt oh a v ead e n s i t yf.L e t F(s−i|si) denote the conditional
distribution of s−i =( s1,.,s i−1,s i+1,..,s n), the signals of buyer i’s rivals, given Si =
si. The value of the tract to buyer i is given by u(V,Si) where u is non-negative,
continuous, and increasing in both arguments. The buyer utilities depend upon the
common component in the same manner and each buyer’s utility is also allowed to
depend upon its own private information. Laﬀont and Vuong [18] refer to this model
as the Aﬃliated Values (AV) model. It was ﬁrst introduced by Wilson [30] and is a
special case of the general symmetric model of Milgrom and Weber [23]. In the AV
model, the signals of the other buyers aﬀect the expected utility of buyer i through
their aﬃliation with V and Si, but they do not enter as an argument of the utility
function.
The aﬃliated values model captures most of the special cases that have been
considered in the literature. It includes the case of pure common values, in which each
buyer’s valuation depends only upon the common factor (i.e., u(V,Si)=V ). It also
includes the case of private values, in which a buyer’s valuation depends only its own
signal (i.e., u(V,Si)=Si). If, in addition, the signals are independently distributed,
then the model is called Independent Private Values (IPV); otherwise it is called
aﬃliated private values (APV). Finally, it includes a class of models that have recently
received attention, in which the common factor can be expressed as a (deterministic)
function of the buyer signals, V = g(Si,S −i),w h e r eg is symmetric, increasing, and
continuous. Deﬁne v(Si,S −i)=u(g(Si,S −i),S i). Then the restrictions on u and g
imply that
si > sj =⇒ v(si,s j,s −i,j) = v(sj,s i,s −i,j)
for all i,j, j 6= i and where s−i,j denotes the signals of all buyers other than i and
j. Each buyer’s valuation can be expressed in terms of a common component and a
private component. For example, Bulow and Klemperer [4] assume that V = Σn
i=1Si
and v(Si,S −i)=( 1+α)Si + Σj6=iSj,w h e r eα>0. If equality holds for all possible
signals, then the model is one of pure common values.
We are primarily interested in comparing the buyers’ payoﬀs in two circumstances:
when there is a coalition of all buyers and when individual buyers behave non-
cooperatively.7 If buyers do not collude, they bid individually and competitively
on the tracts in the seller’s ﬁrst-price sealed bid auction. The equilibrium payoﬀso f
this auction determines the buyers’ participation constraints. If the buyers collude,
the ring must decide whether or not to acquire the tract at cost r and how to divide
the collusive surplus. A ring mechanism is ex post eﬃcient if (i) the buyer with the
7One way that this situation can occur is if each buyer has veto power: if any buyer refuses to
join the ring, then the ring breaks down.
9highest signal is given the exclusive right to purchase the tract and (ii) he does so
if and only if the expected value of the tract conditional on the signals of all buyers
exceeds r. Condition (ii) is the distinguishing feature of common value environments.
In private value environments, each buyer knows whether or not he is willing to pay
at least r for the asset. In common value environments, buyers need to share their
information to determine whether or not their willingness to pay exceeds r.T h e
pooling of information is especially valuable if r is large. Note that condition (i) is
not necessary in the case of pure common values. If all buyers value the tract equally
conditional on the same information, then any allocation satisfying condition (ii) is
ex post eﬃcient.
A key issue in specifying the payoﬀs to bidding competitively (or collusively)
is whether buyers infer anything about each other’s private information from their
participation decision. Cramton and Palfrey [8] refer to the possibility of learning as
the leakage problem.8 We believe that this problem can be ignored in oﬀshore oil and
gas auction because the joint venture decision is taken with respect to a block of tracts
and not on individual tracts. If buyer i refuses to join the ring, then the other buyers
may infer that buyer i has obtained favorable information about one or more tracts
in the area, but they do not know which tracts and, since most are not worth bidding
for, the inference is likely to have very little impact on bidding behavior on individual
tracts. The situation would be quite diﬀerent if the decision to collude is taken on a
tract by tract basis. In that case, refusal to bid jointly on a tract could cause beliefs
about that tract, and therefore bidding behavior, to change. Indeed, we suspect that
this is the reason why the geographical unit of the joint venture agreement is not an
individual tract but a large block of tracts.
We can now specify the participation constraints. Without loss of generality, we
set n equal to two, a restriction that simpliﬁes the notation considerably. Deﬁne
w(s,t)=E[u(V,Si)|Si = s,Sj = t]
as buyer i’s expected value of the tract conditional on the event that his signal is
equal to s and buyer j’s signal is equal to t. We assume that r is less than w(1,1),
8In an earlier version of this paper, Hendricks and Porter [14] considered an extensive form game
in which ﬁrms simultaneously voted “yes” or “no” to an equal-sharing joint venture. Firms that voted
“yes” formed a ring and ﬁrms that voted “no” bid competitively against each other and the ring.
More generally, Cramton and Palfrey [8] consider a two-stage game in which ﬁrms simultaneously
vote for or against a proposed mechanism and have veto power. If the mechanism is unanimously
ratiﬁed, an all-inclusive ring forms and mechanism is implemented; otherwise the ring does not form
and the ﬁrms bid competitively against each other. One diﬃculty with these game forms is the
assumption that ﬁrms can commit not to renegotiate the outcome of their vote to an alternative
mechanism in which all ﬁrms gain. For example, if two ﬁrms say “no” to an equal-sharing joint
venture, each may infer that the other has a high signal and, conditional on this information, be
better oﬀ colluding.
10the highest possible valuation. It will also be convenient to normalize payoﬀss ot h a t
w(0,0) = 0.
Suppose both buyers use a symmetric bidding strategy B(s) with boundary con-
dition B(a)=r where







Here a is the cutoﬀ signal below which the buyer does not believe the tract is worth
r conditional on winning. It is straightforward to show that equilibrium proﬁts to a


















Note that πNC is equal to zero for s<aand increasing for s>a .
In our application, ﬁrms typically do not form bidding coalitions until after they
have acquired their private signals. Thus, the relevant participation constraints are
interim: for every possible realization of the signal, a buyer must expect to be at least
as well oﬀ bidding jointly as he is bidding separately. We shall refer to the ﬁrst-price
sealed bid auction in which buyers bid individually and noncooperatively as the status
quo mechanism.
4E ﬃcient Collusion
The standard approach to mechanism design is to exploit the revelation principle
and study collusive direct revelation mechanisms. However, as is well known, char-
acterizing the set of incentive compatible collusive mechanisms is quite complicated
when signals are aﬃliated. An alternative approach is to consider a speciﬁci n d i r e c t
mechanism and investigate the conditions under which it generates an ex post eﬃ-
cient allocation that satisﬁes ex post budget balance and individual rationality. The
mechanism that we consider is an augmented form of the ﬁrst-price knockout auction
11described in McAfee and McMillan [22]. We show that this mechanism always works
when the asset is a private value asset, extending the results obtained in the litera-
ture. However, when the asset is a common value asset, buyers with high signals may
obtain higher payoﬀs in the status quo mechanism than in the collusive mechanism.
We then consider the common value model with independent signals and establish
an impossibility result using collusive direct revelation mechanisms. We identify and
characterize conditions under which ex post eﬃciency, budget balance, and individual
rationality are not compatible for any indirect mechanism.
4.1 The First-Price Knockout Auction
In the knockout auction, each member submits a sealed bid, the member with the
highest bid is awarded the exclusive right to acquire the tract at cost r from the
seller, and pays his bid to the “losing” buyer. Ties are resolved by randomization.
The losing buyer reports his signal to the winning buyer. The winning buyer updates
his beliefs about the value of the tract and purchases it from the seller at price r if
and only if the expected value of the tract conditional on his signal and the reported
signal of the losing buyer exceeds r.
In the ring, a bidder learns his rival’s signal before he has to decide whether or
not to pay r to the seller whereas, in the status quo mechanism, he learns his rival’s
signal after he pays his bid to the seller, if at all. Let b denote the cutoﬀ signal below
which a buyer does not bid in the knockout auction. It is deﬁned as w(b,b)=r.
The interpretation of b is that it is the lowest signal at which a buyer can win the
knockout auction (i.e., t<b ) and be certain that the tract is not worth purchasing
conditional on all of the available information. At any higher signal, a buyer is willing
to pay a positive amount for the right to purchase the tract at price r since there is
some chance that, after winning and learning the other buyer’s signal, his valuation
exceeds r. It follows from Assumption 1 that b is unique.
When valuations are private, the buyer’s purchasing decision is contingent only
on his own valuation. He bids in either auction if and only if his valuation exceeds r,
which implies that a = b.T h ed i ﬀerence in the timing of the revelation of a rival’s
signal does matter when values are aﬃliated, assuming the reserve price is positive.







dt < w(a,a)= ⇒ b<a .
Buyers who draw signals between b and a are willing to bid a positive amount in the
knockout auction but are not willing to bid in the status quo mechanism. As we shall
12see, the more aggressive bidding by buyers with low signals in the knockout auction
can cause buyers with high signals to prefer the status quo mechanism.
Suppose that in the knockout auction both buyers use a symmetric, increasing bid
strategy BK(s) with boundary condition BK(b)=0 . It is straightforward to show




























It is easily checked that BK is strictly increasing on the interval [b,1]. For s<b ,
we deﬁne BK(s)=0 . The expected payoﬀ to a ring member is strictly positive and
constant for s less than b, and strictly increasing in s above b.
Since the loser’s report does not aﬀect his payment, he has no reason not to tell
the truth. In fact, the only circumstance in which he needs to report his signal is
when it is less than b. Otherwise, the winning buyer can infer his signal from his bid.
Symmetry and monotonicity implies that the mechanism selects the buyer with the
highest signal provided it exceeds b. Ties occur if both buyers submit a bid of zero, but
in that case it does not matter who is selected since neither buyer wants to purchase
the tract. The selected buyer purchases the tract if and only if w(s,t) exceeds r.T h e
transfers among the buyers sum to zero by deﬁnition. We have therefore established
the following result.
Lemma 1 The ﬁrst-price knockout auction with information sharing is an ex post
eﬃcient mechanism that satisﬁes ex post budget balance.
It is worth emphasizing the role of symmetry in the above lemma. The ﬁrst-price
knockout selects the buyer with the highest signal, but eﬃciency requires that the ring
select the buyer with the highest valuation conditional on all of the private signals. In
symmetric models, these two criteria are equivalent, which explains why information
sharing creates no incentive problems.
Do the payoﬀs of the knockout auction satisfy the interim participation con-
straints? Bidders with signals below a earn a positive payoﬀ in the knockout auction
and zero in the status quo mechanism. Clearly, they are better oﬀ in the coalition. In
order to compare the payoﬀs for buyers with signals above a,w en e e dt h ef o l l o w i n g
technical lemma. Subscripts denote partial derivatives.






≥ 0 for all s ≤ t.
Lemma 2 is an implication of aﬃliation and its proof is relegated to the appendix.
Our next lemma compares the slopes of the equilibrium proﬁt functions.
























Lemma 3 generates suﬃcient conditions under which the payoﬀso ft h ek n o c k -
out auction satisfy the interim participation constraints. It identiﬁes two competing
eﬀects on the relative slopes of the equilibrium proﬁt functions: the aﬃliation of
signals eﬀect and the information sharing eﬀect.T h e a ﬃliation eﬀect favors
ring formation. To see why, consider ﬁrst the benchmark case of independent pri-
vate values. In a private value environment, the second term in equation (3) is zero
since r = a. Independence implies F2(s|t)=f2(t|s)=0 , which in turn implies that
A(s,t)=0 . As a result, the ﬁrst, third and fourth terms in equation (3) are also
zero in the IPV environment. Since buyers with signals less than a receive a strictly
positive payment in the knockout auction and zero in the competitive auction, this
result implies that πK(s) exceeds πNC(s) by a positive constant for all s>a .9
Now suppose values are private but signals are (strictly) aﬃliated. In this case,

















f2(t|s)dt − F2(s|s)=0 .
The fourth term is positive by Lemma 2. Since πK(a) is greater than πNC(a),i tt h e n
follows from Lemma 3 that πK(s) exceeds πNC(s) for all s>a .
Proposition 4 Suppose values are private. Then the ﬁrst-price knockout auction
is an ex post eﬃcient mechanism that satisﬁes ex post budget balance and interim
participation constraints.
9Mailath and Zemsky [19] obtain a similar result for second-price auctions.
14The key feature of the private value environment is that the buyer’s decision to
purchase the tract does not depend upon the signal of the other buyer. This situation
also arises in an aﬃliated value environment when the reserve price is zero. It is
easily checked that the second and third terms in equation (3) vanish when r =0 .
The diﬀerence in slopes between the two proﬁt functions is positive when the proﬁts
are equal, as the fourth term is positive and the ﬁrst is zero in that case. Further,
πK(0) exceeds πNC(0). Hence, the curves do not cross and πK(s) exceeds πNC(s) for
all s.
Proposition 5 Suppose the reserve price is not binding. Then the ﬁrst-price knock-
out auction with information sharing is an ex post eﬃcient mechanism that satisﬁes
ex post budget balance and interim participation constraints.
McAfee and McMillan [22] show that buyers can collude eﬃciently and earn higher
payoﬀs when values are private and independently distributed. Proposition 4 extends
both of these results to aﬃliated private values. Proposition 5 extends them to the
aﬃliated value environment with no binding reserve price. The intuition for why
aﬃliation in the absence of information sharing favors the ring is that bidding in the
status quo mechanism is relatively more competitive under aﬃliation.
The information sharing eﬀect works against the formation of an all-inclusive ring.
To see this, deﬁne θ(s) as
w(s,θ(s)) = r.
Since w is increasing in both arguments, and s>a>b ,w eh a v et h a tθ(s) <b .As a


















where w1 is the partial derivative of w with respect to the ﬁrst argument. The term
is a measure of the ineﬃciency of the competitive auction. When the other buyer’s
signal lies between 0 and θ(s),t h ee ﬃcient decision is not to purchase the tract
from the seller. This outcome is implemented by the ring but not in the status quo
mechanism. As s increases, the eﬀect of the ineﬃciency decreases since θ(s) falls.
This causes πNC to increase more rapidly with s than πK. Consequently, πK can
intersect πNC at a signal above a, violating the participation constraints at higher
signals. We provide an example below in which this occurs. Note that the third term
15in equation (3) cannot be signed. It depends on the interaction of the information
sharing and aﬃliation eﬀects.
Why may buyers with high signals prefer to bid competitively for common value
tracts? The reason is the winner’s curse. Fear of the winner’s curse causes buyers
to bid cautiously in the status quo mechanism, and buyers with low signals do not
participate. The latter leads to ineﬃcient trade, since no one may bid even though
at least one of the buyers would be willing to do so if he knew all of the private
signals. (The converse is also true - a buyer may purchase the tract in the status quo
mechanism when he would not do so if informed of his rival’s signal.) By contrast, the
ring is eﬃcient. The winning bidder in the knockout auction learns the private signals
of the other members, and therefore purchases the tract if and only if his valuation
conditional on all of the private signals exceeds investment costs. The eﬃciency of
the ring works to the advantage of buyers with low signals but against a buyer with
a high signal. He ends up paying less to the seller but more to the other buyers.
Under the conditions of Propositions 4 and 5, the status quo mechanism is eﬃcient
and hence there is no tradeoﬀ between eﬃcient collusion and individual rationality.
In common value auctions with a binding reserve price, the status quo mechanism
is ineﬃcient and eﬃcient collusion may be incompatible with individual rationality.
However, a ring may be able to guarantee its members payoﬀs that exceed what they
can earn in the status quo mechanism if it is willing to sacriﬁce eﬃciency.
Proposition 6 The ﬁrst-price knockout auction without information sharing is a
mechanism that satisﬁes ex post budget balance and interim participation constraints.
The proof of Proposition 6 is given in Appendix A. Note that, as in the case of
Propositions 4 and 5, the ring is using a mechanism that implements the same trades
as the status quo mechanism. However, it is diﬃcult to imagine oil and gas ﬁrms
enforcing a joint venture contract that prohibits them from sharing information on
individual tracts in the area covered by the agreement when it is ex post optimal for
them to do so.
4.2 Optimal Ring Mechanisms
The preceding analysis demonstrates that, if information-sharing is important, a
buyer with a high signal may prefer the status quo mechanism to an all-inclusive
ring which uses a ﬁrst-price knockout auction to allocate the option to purchase the
t r a c ta tp r i c er. However, this result is not very interesting if there exist other eﬃcient
ring mechanisms that do satisfy interim rationality. To study this issue, we exploit
the revelation principle and study collusive direct revelation mechanisms. Our main
result is that buyers with high signals may prefer the status quo mechanism to any
16eﬃcient ring mechanism, and not just the ﬁrst-price knockout auction, when signals
are independently distributed.
In a collusive direct revelation mechanism, the ring’s representative in the seller’s
auction, and side-payments between the buyers, are determined as functions of the
buyers’ reported signals. The mechanism is a pair {Q,P} where Q :[ 0 ,1]2 → [0,1]
2
and P :[ 0 ,1]2 → R2.L e txi denote the report by buyer i.G i v e nr e p o r t s(x1,x 2),t h e
probability that buyer i obtains the right to bid in the seller’s auction is Qi(xi,x j)
and its expected side-payment is Pi(xi,x j). Clearly,
Q1(x1,x 2)+Q2(x1,x 2) ≤ 1
for all (x1,x 2) ∈ [0,1]2. We assume that transfers are feasible if they satisfy
P1(x1,x 2)+P2(x1,x 2)=0 (4)
for every pair of reported signals (x1,x 2). This requires the ring to balance its budget
ex post. A weaker requirement is ex ante budget balance which only requires that
transfers between buyers sum to zero on average.
Suppose buyer j reports truthfully. Then the payoﬀ to buyer i with signal si and
report xi is
πi(si,x i)=Esj[Qi(xi,s j)max{w(si,s j) − r,0} + Pi(xi,s j)]. (5)
Denote πi(si,s i) by πi(si).Ar i n gm e c h a n i s m{Q,P} is incentive compatible if for all
si,x i ∈ [0,1], i =1 ,2,
πi(si) ≥ πi(si,x i).
The following standard lemma characterizes the set of incentive compatible mecha-
nisms.
Lemma 7 A ring mechanism {Q,P} is incentive compatible if and only if for any
si,x i ∈ [0,1],
dπi(si)
dsi
= Esj[Qi(si,s j) ∂
∂si max{w(si,s j) − r, 0}], (6)
and
Esj[(∂Qi(xi,s j)/∂xi)max{w(si,s j) − r, 0}] ≥ 0. (7)
Eﬃciency implies that the buyer with highest valuation is awarded the exclusive
right to acquire the tract at price r and does so if and only if the expected value of




1 if si >s j >θ (si)
0 otherwise .
Combining the incentive compatibility and budget balance with eﬃciency yields the
following characterization.
17Proposition 8 Suppose signals are independently distributed and w(s,t) >w (t,s)
for all s>t .T h e n t h e p a y o ﬀ to buyer i with signal s in any ex post eﬃcient,






[w(s,t) − r]dF(t) −
Z s
b
[w(t,t) − r]dF(t) (8)
for s>band it is equal to πi0 otherwise, where
π10 + π20 =2
Z 1
b
[w(t,t) − r][1 − F(t)]dF(t).
Ex post eﬃciency, incentive compatibility, and ex ante budget balance uniquely
determine the payoﬀ of each member of the ring up to a constant. In an anonymous
mechanism, the buyers are treated symmetrically, which implies that π10 = π20.
Any indirect, anonymous ring mechanism that is ex post eﬃcient and satisﬁes the
stronger restriction of ex post budget balance generates identical expected payoﬀs.
It then follows from Lemma 1 that these payoﬀs can implemented by the ﬁrst-price
knockout auction.
Corollary 9 Suppose signals are independently distributed and w(s,t) >w (t,s) for
all s>t .T h e na n ye ﬃcient, incentive compatible, anonymous ring mechanism can
be implemented by a ﬁrst-price knockout auction with information sharing.
The corollary extends McAfee and McMillan’s result for an independent private values
model to aﬃliated value models with independent signals. Of course, the ﬁrst-price
knockout auction is not the only implementable mechanism. A second-price knockout
auction also works.
Proposition 10 Suppose signals are independently distributed and w(s,t) >w (t,s)
for all s>t .A n ye xp o s te ﬃcient, incentive compatible, budget balancing ring mech-
anism satisﬁes the interim participation constraints if and only if πC
i (1) >π NC
i (1) for
i =1 ,2.
Proposition 10 establishes a useful necessary and suﬃcient condition for eﬃciency,
incentive compatibility, and budget balance to conﬂict with the interim participation
constraints. We exploit this condition in the next section to illustrate the conditions
under which competitive bidding yields higher proﬁts for high types.
In a pure common value environment with independent signals, eﬃciency does
not require that the buyer with the highest signal win the tract. Ex post eﬃciency
is attained regardless of which buyer wins the tract, as long as the buyers report
18their private signals. In this case, a weak ring, which McAfee and McMillan de-
ﬁn ea sar i n gt h a tc a n n o tm a k et r a n s f e rp a y m e n t s ,c a nb ee ﬃcient. The mechanism
that awards the right to purchase the tract randomly to one member, and all other
members report their private signals, is eﬃcient and incentive compatible. The equal
sharing mechanism in which members report their signals, and share costs and rev-
enues equally is another eﬃcient, incentive compatible mechanism. Note, however,
that these mechanisms do not generate the same payoﬀsa st h eﬁrst-price knockout
auction. The indeterminacy of the allocation rule implies that eﬃciency, incentive
compatibility, budget balance and anonymity do not uniquely determine the payoﬀs
to ring members.







if and only if s ≥ t.T h e na n ye xp o s te ﬃcient, incentive compatible, budget balancing
ring mechanism fails to satisfy the interim participation constraints if πK
i (1) <π NC
i (1)
for i =1 ,2.
Proposition 11 establishes a useful suﬃcient condition for checking whether an indirect
mechanism such as the equal-sharing mechanism conﬂicts with interim rationality.
If the highest type obtains a higher payoﬀ from bidding competitively than from
colluding when the ring uses a ﬁrst-price knockout auction, then it also prefers the
status quo mechanism to a ring that uses the equal-sharing mechanism, or any other
eﬃcient, incentive compatible, budget balancing mechanism.
The payoﬀs are also not uniquely determined in the aﬃliated values model when
signals are aﬃliated. For instance, the ﬁrst-price and second-price knockout auctions
generate diﬀerent payoﬀs. In these cases, the interim participation constraints may
be compatible with the above three conditions but the characterization of incentive
compatibility is quite complicated. In any case, even if the conditions are compatible,
the indirect mechanism that implements those payoﬀs is not likely to be simple.
Finally, it is worth noting that the analysis of this section also applies to second-
price auctions. It can be shown that the buyer’s equilibrium payoﬀs in the second-
price and ﬁrst-price auctions are the same when signals are independently distributed.
5 An Illustrative Example
When does the equilibrium payoﬀ from competitive bidding exceed the expected
payoﬀ to collusion? Is an all-inclusive ring more likely to form in auctions with more
buyers? We address these questions using a parametric example.
19Suppose there are three potential buyers and their preferences are given by
u(V,Si)=V = S1 + S2 + S3.
For simplicity, we have used equal weights, which makes the model one of pure com-
mon values. The signals of the buyer are assumed to be independent random variables
with distribution F(s)=sq,w h e r eq>0. The parameter q determines the shape of
the distribution. A higher value of q shifts probability mass away from lower signals





Note that if q =1 , signals are uniformly distributed on the unit interval. We use r
to parameterize the importance of the information sharing eﬀect.
5.1 Two Buyers
We ﬁrst consider the case in which two of the three potential buyers have searched
the area and obtained their signals. To facilitate a comparison with three buyers, we
hold the expected value of the tract constant by integrating over S3 and replacing its
value with µ.I fr>µ , the critical cutoﬀ signal for participation in the competitive










Here we subscript the cutoﬀ values by the number of buyers. If r<µ ,t h e na2 = b2 =
0, since every type is willing to bid in the seller’s auction, and information sharing
has no value. Note that the set of types that bid in the knockout but not in the status
quo mechanism, a2−b2, decreases with q and increases with r. Using Proposition 10,
we can identify the values of q and r where individual rationality fails to be satisﬁed
by comparing the equilibrium proﬁts of the highest type. The equilibrium payoﬀ to


























max{r − µ − 1,0}1+q
1+q
.
20Details on the derivations of these equations are given in Appendix B.
Figure 1 compares the two payoﬀs for the highest type in (r,q) space. The solid
curve is the locus of points where the highest type’s ring proﬁts are equal to his proﬁts
in the status quo mechanism. The region below this curve represents the area where
highest type earns more from the status quo mechanism than from the ring. For ﬁxed
r,ah i g h e rv a l u eo fq means that information sharing becomes less valuable, causing
the highest buyer to bid relatively more aggressively in the status quo mechanism
than the knockout auction. Thus, high values of q favor the ring over the status quo
mechanism. For ﬁxed q,a ni n c r e a s ei nr makes information sharing more valuable.
This has two eﬀects on the highest type’s payoﬀs. It enhances his strategic advantage
in the competitive auction, since the winner’s curse is stronger and scares oﬀ more
types. But it also makes learning the other buyer’s signal more valuable. The ﬁrst
eﬀect dominates for low values of r (i.e., r<1) and the second dominates for high
values of r (i.e., r>1). The trade-oﬀ between these two eﬀects accounts for the
non-monotonic relationship between q and r.
In our application, rings frequently use the equal-sharing mechanism, which is
eﬃcient and incentive compatible in our example. Using Proposition 11, we can
identify the values of q and r where individual rationality fails for the highest type.
T h ed a s h e dl i n ei nF i g u r e1c o r r e s p o n d st op o i n t sw h e r et h eh i g h e s tt y p e ’ sp r o ﬁts
from the equal-sharing ring are equal to his proﬁts in the status quo mechanism.
Clearly, the region where the equal-sharing mechanism is not enforceable is larger
than and contains the region where the ﬁrst-price knockout is not enforceable. Thus,
the ring is more likely to form when it allocates the exclusive right to bid in the seller’s
a u c t i o nw i t haﬁrst-price knockout auction than when an equal-sharing agreement is
employed.
5.2 Three Buyers










It is easy to show that the set of types that bid in the knockout but not in the status
quo mechanism is larger with three than two buyers (i.e., a3 − b3 >a 2 − b2). The








21His payoﬀ in the knockout auction does not have a closed form solution and requires
numerical integration.
Figure 2 compares the highest type’s payoﬀs in the status quo mechanism and
in the ﬁrst-price knockout ring mechanism. The region below the dashed and solid
curves represent the areas where the all-inclusive ring is not enforceable when there
are, respectively, two and three buyers. Neither area is a subset of the other, although
the area in the three buyer case is smaller. The increase in n has two eﬀects. First, the
winner’s curse is strengthened, which enhances the high type’s strategic advantage
in the status quo mechanism but makes information pooling more valuable. When r
is low, the strategic advantage is more important and the additional buyer reduces
the likelihood that the ring is enforceable. When r is high, information pooling is
more important, and the additional buyer makes it more likely for the ring to be
enforceable. Second, the level of competition increases. Since the competitive eﬀect
is stronger in the status quo mechanism than in the ring mechanism, the area in
which the ring is not enforceable is reduced.
We conjecture that the competitive eﬀect dominates as the number of buyers gets
large and that, in the limit, the all-inclusive ring satisﬁes the participation constraints.
The problem with studying this issue in the context of a common value model with
independent signals is that the value of the tract goes to inﬁnity with the number
of signals. The expected value of the tract needs to be held constant as the number
of buyers gets large. However, it is not diﬃcult to specify aﬃliated environments in
which even buyers with the highest signal will not want to participate in the status
quo mechanism as the number of buyers gets large (i.e., an converges to 1). In these
cases, the ring satisﬁes individual rationality since all buyers make positive proﬁts
from collusion. More generally, one wants to show that πNC converges to zero faster
than πK, which is likely to be true since aggregate expected proﬁt converges to zero
in the status quo mechanism and to a positive constant in the knockout auction.
In summary, the all-inclusive ring is not enforceable when priors are pessimistic
(i.e., q is low), acquisition costs are substantial (i.e., r is not too low or too high),
and the number of buyers is small.
6 Partial Rings
In our application to oﬀshore oil and gas auctions, subsets of buyers can and often do
form rings. Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, we brieﬂy discuss the issues
involved in studying partial rings.
If there are more than two buyers and no buyer has veto power, then an alterna-
tive speciﬁcation of the participation constraint is the equilibrium payoﬀ t oab u y e r
in a ﬁrst-price sealed bid auction in which one buyer bids against a ring of size n−1.
22The noncolluding bidder gains from the reduction in competition, which makes the
all-inclusive ring less stable. For example, McAfee and McMillan study a simple
m o d e li nw h i c he a c hb u y e r ’ sp r i v a t ev a l u ei sa ni n d e p e n d e n tB e r n o u l l ir a n d o mv a r i -
able. They show that, in equilibrium, the noncolluding bidder is better oﬀ than ring
members, and that a ring of at least three bidders always forms. Thus, a ring always
forms, but the reduced competition eﬀect can explain partial rings. The situation is
more complicated when values are aﬃliated, since the noncolluding bidder is at an
informational disadvantage when his rivals form a ring, and this eﬀect could oﬀset
the beneﬁt from the reduction in competition. Our focus, however, is on the partic-
ipation decision of the high signal buyer on marginal tracts when n is small. If the
distribution of signals is suﬃciently skewed towards low signals, then the buyer with
the high signal knows that his rivals are unlikely to bid for the tract, individually or
as a ring. In either case, he faces essentially the same tradeoﬀs, and prefers to bid
alone. Furthermore, only one solo bid would typically be observed.
A formal analysis of partial rings in common value environments is well beyond the
scope of this paper. When a partial ring of size n−1 competes against a noncolluding
buyer, the auction is not symmetric: the partial ring observes n − 1 signals and
the noncolluding buyer observes only one signal. It is possible to compute bidding
equilibria if the partial ring’s information can be summarized by a one-dimensional
summary statistic, but the general case of multi-dimensional buyer types has not been
solved. The other diﬃcult conceptual issue is that a partial ring has to decide not
only whether to bid, but how much to bid, and this decision can aﬀect the incentives
of its members to reveal their signals.10 In particular, the ﬁrst-price knockout auction
mechanism with information sharing may not have a monotone equilibrium, in which
case it is not an ex post eﬃcient mechanism for a partial ring. In fact, this may be the
reason why oil and gas ﬁrms in our sample typically collude using the equal-sharing
mechanism. In a pure common value model, the equal-sharing mechanism may be ex
post eﬃcient for any size ring.
7 Empirical Analysis
In order to evaluate the predictions of the theoretical model described above, we must
confront two measurement issues. First, we require a measure of the level of potential
competition on a given tract, and a measure of ﬁrms’ priors with respect to the likely
10This problem does not arise when the status quo mechanism is a second-price auction and values
are private. The simplifying feature of this auction is that it has a dominant strategy equilibrium in
which each buyer bids his valuation. Hence, a noncolluding buyer faces the same high bid whether
his rivals form a ring (of any size) or not, assuming the ring selects the member with the highest
valuation. Mailath and Zemsky show that, in this case, the all-inclusive ring is in the core.
23value of the tract. The decision to bid is endogenous, because post-sale drilling costs
are non-trivial, and hence the number of bids submitted will be correlated with the
inferences ﬁrms draw from their seismic analysis. We therefore construct a measure
of the number of potential bidders for a given tract, based on the number of ﬁrms
active in a neighboring region. This measure of the number of potential bidders is also
correlated with ﬁrms’ prior expectations, because the decision to conduct a detailed
seismic analysis depends on those priors. We examine how the propensity to submit
joint bids varies with the number of potential bidders, where the latter variable is
probably a proxy for both the level of potential competition and for ﬁrms’ priors.
Second, we require a measure of the incidence of cooperative bidding arrange-
ments. We assume that any such negotiation results in the submission of a joint bid.
We ﬁrst provide some evidence consistent with this assumption. We examine whether
there is evidence that bidding negotiations in one area spill over into other areas, in
the sense that the participants in the joint bid are less likely to submit competing bids
in other regions oﬀered in the same sale. We do not ﬁnd evidence of these sorts of
spillovers. Instead, joint bidding appears to be local to a speciﬁca r e ai nag i v e ns a l e .
We therefore examine the joint bidding patterns of the most active bidders to see
whether these patterns are consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model.
Our sample consists of the nine sales of wildcat tracts oﬀ the coasts of Texas and
Louisiana during the period 1954 to 1970 inclusive, in which a total of 1,260 tracts
received bids. The information available for each tract receiving at least one bid
includes the date of sale; the location; the identity of all bidders and the amounts
they bid; the identity of participants in joint bids and their shares in the bid; and
whether the government accepted the high bid.
We shall focus on the most active participants in the OCS auctions. Hundreds
of ﬁrms bid infrequently, and there are many ﬁrms that only bid jointly with the
major bidders. These latter ﬁr m st e n d e dt oh o l ds m a l l e rs h a r e si nt h ej o i n tb i d .B o t h
they and the infrequent bidders were unlikely to be as experienced and informed as
the major bidders and were probably not perceived as serious competitors by the
m a j o rb i d d e r s .W ef o c u so nt h et w e l v eﬁrms and bidding consortia with the highest
participation rates in our sample. Table 1 lists these major bidders and their bidding
activities. The ﬁrms in the Arco bidding consortium pooled their exploration budgets
and expertise and bid almost exclusively with each other. We treat this consortium
as a single ﬁrm. The twelve ﬁrms and consortia are designated as large ﬁrms, which
we call the Big12. All other ﬁrms are referred to as fringe ﬁrms. For the purposes of
this paper, we deﬁne a joint bid as one in which two or more large ﬁrms participated.
All other bids are called solo bids. The ﬁrst two columns of Table 1 give the number
of solo and joint bids of each large ﬁrm.11 T h et w e l v el a r g eﬁrms account for about
11A small number of tracts registered multiple bids by a ﬁrm. This problem may in part due to
2475% of all bids in our sample.12
As indicated in Table 1, joint bids account for 18.6% of the total bids submitted
by the Big12. Of the Big12 joint bids, 89.4% involve pairs of Big12 ﬁrms, and the
remainder involves triples. (The totals reported for the second and third columns are
misleading, since there is some double and triple counting.) There are no joint bids
with more than three Big12 participants. It is striking that joint bids are relatively
infrequent, despite their legality, and that joint bids usually just involve pairs of large
ﬁrms.
Note that participation rates in joint bids are not uniform among Big12 ﬁrms.
Shell rarely participated in joint bids, and Forest never did. Shell had a reputation as
being better informed than other major bidders, by virtue of access to ”bright spot”
seismic technology, and generally having capable seismic geologists. This information
superiority may account for their unwillingness to participate in joint bids. In some of
the remaining tables, we will restrict attention to what we call the Big10, consisting
of the Big12 less Shell and Forest, as this is the set of large ﬁrms that bid jointly
frequently.
Our measure of  t, the number of potential bidders on tract t, is constructed
f r o mi n f o r m a t i o no nw h ob i di nt h ea r e aa r o u n dt h i st r a c t ,a n dw h e n . F o rt r a c t s
that were drilled, location is identiﬁed by the longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates
of the well. Tracts that were not drilled are assigned coordinates by interpolation
from nearby tracts that were drilled.13 On average a tract covers 0.0463 degrees
of longitude and 0.0405 degrees of latitude. A neighborhood for tract t consists of
all tracts whose registered locations are within 0.1158 (2.5 times 0.0463) degrees of
longitude and 0.1012 (2.5 times 0.0405) degrees of latitude of tract t and that were
oﬀered for sale at the same time as or before tract t. Ignoring irregular tract
sizes and boundary eﬀects, the maximum possible size of a neighborhood is 25 tracts
or 125,000 acres.
An obvious approach to deﬁning the number of potential bidders on a tract is
simply to count the number of Big12 ﬁrms that bid on the tract or in its neighborhood.
The rationale is that if a Big12 ﬁrm is interested in the area, then it will probably bid
on at least one tract. One diﬃculty with this measure is the treatment of joint bids.
Firms that submit solo bids on tract t are counted as potential bidders since they are
classiﬁcation errors in identifying a ﬁrm’s subsidiaries and aﬃliates. We adopted the following rule
for these bids. If a subset of the participants in one bid participated in another bid, the latter is
dropped. Thus, solo bids of bidders who also submitted joint bids are eliminated. In the other cases,
the highest bid is taken and the others dropped.
12See Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong [5] for a structural analysis of joint and solo bids within an
APV framework.
13A small number of tracts were suﬃciently isolated that it was not possible to interpolate their
location from nearby tracts. These tracts were dropped from the sample.
25revealed to be active. For the purposes of this paper, any large ﬁrm that participated
i naj o i n tb i do nt r a c tt is treated as a potential bidder, regardless of how they bid on
other tracts in the neighborhood of tract t. (In contrast, Hendricks, Pinkse and Porter
[15] count all the participants in joint bids as one potential bidder, whether or not
they submitted solo bids elsewhere in the neighborhood.) The implicit assumption
here is that any participant in a joint bid could have been a solo competitor. We also
include ﬁrms that did not bid on tract t but submitted solo bids on at least one tract
in the neighborhood. Firms that did not bid on tract t a n dp a r t i c i p a t e di naj o i n tb i d
on tracts in the neighborhood of tract t are also counted as single competitors.
Our measure of the number of potential bidders on a tract may overstate the
true level of competition. For example, all participants in joint bids are treated as
potential competitors, as noted above. Also, solo bids are always treated as evidence
of competitive behavior. But ﬁrms could coordinate bidding strategies by agreeing to
bid solo on diﬀerent sets of tracts rather than bidding jointly. Our measure does not
capture this form of collusion. We return to this issue in the next subsection. On
the other hand, ﬁrms known to be interested in the area but who decided not to bid
on any tracts in the neighborhood of tract t are not counted in  t. We might then
underestimate the number of potential bidders.
The ﬁnal column in Table 1 reports the number of tracts where each large ﬁrm is
counted as a potential bidder.
7.1 Evidence of Bid Coordination
In his Congressional testimony in 1976, Darius Gaskins argued that the collusive
eﬀects of joint ventures should not be measured solely in terms of tracts receiving
joint bids. The negotiations over which areas to bid jointly could allow partners to
learn more about each others’ bidding intentions in areas where no joint bids are
submitted. In fact, if partners in a joint venture are risk neutral, they could collude
by allocating tracts or areas to diﬀerent partners. For example, the outcome of joint
venture agreements could be that ﬁrms bid jointly in areas where both ﬁrms have
searched and each bids solo in areas where it alone has searched. Alternatively, if
they use a knockout-style auction on a tract-by-tract basis, then one partner may
submit a solo bid and no joint bids may be observed.
In order to assess whether joint bidding negotiations aﬀected competition in areas
other than those where joint bids were submitted, we exploit two features of the data.
First, if a pair of ﬁrms submitted joint bids on some tracts in a given sale, they tended
to do so only on a subset of the areas in that sale. Second, these pairs of ﬁrms usually
submitted joint bids on a subset of the sales.
Our empirical strategy is to examine the bidding behavior of pairs of Big10 ﬁrms
when both are potential bidders. We compare their likelihood of submitting bids
26for three sets of tracts. We distinguish between areas where they submitted a joint
bid in that sale, areas in sales in which the pair submitted a contemporaneous joint
bid in another area, and areas in sales in which no joint bids were submitted by the
pair. If joint bidding negotiations aﬀect bidding patterns in other areas being sold
contemporaneously, then there will be a diﬀerence in bidding patterns between the
second and third categories of tracts. That is, one might expect ﬁrms that bid jointly
i no n ea r e at ob el e s sl i k e l yt oc o m p e t ei no t h e ra r e a so ﬀered in the same sale. If so,
then it would be a mistake to infer a lack of cooperation from a low incidence of joint
bidding.
Tables 2 and 3 look at the propensity for Big10 ﬁrms to submit competing solo
bids, or to refrain from bidding, for the three sets of tracts described above. Table
2 considers tracts with 2 to 4 potential Big10 bidders, and Table 3 tracts with 5 or
more potential Big10 bidders. The unit of observation is, for each tract, all pairs of
potential Big10 bidders. Because of this sampling frame, numbers are not directly
comparable across rows in Tables 2 and 3, and we instead focus on comparisons across
columns. For each pair of potential Big10 bidders on a given tract, the rows report
how many times neither bids (”No bid”); only one of the two submits a solo bid, or
a joint bid in partnership with another ﬁrm (Solo); both submit a solo bid, or a bid
in partnership with another ﬁrm (Compete); they submit a joint bid with no other
large partner (JB2); or they submit a joint bid with another large partner (JB3).
The ﬁrst column of Table 2 indicates that, for  t between 2 and 4, Big10 ﬁrms
that bid jointly never submit competing solo bids on other tracts in the neighborhood.
They do submit solo bids, but not competing bids on the same tract. This is consistent
with our notion that joint bidding negotiations are area-wide, as opposed to tract
speciﬁc. The corresponding numbers in Table 3 are less striking, but tell a similar
story. Competing solo bids are relatively unlikely by ﬁrms submitting joint bids in
an area, in comparison with areas without joint bidding by that pair.
The second and third columns of Tables 2 and 3 compare bidding propensities in
areas with a contemporaneous joint bid by the pair in another area, and areas with no
contemporaneous joint bids by the pair. The frequencies reported in the second and
third columns of Table 2 are virtually identical. The frequencies in the comparable
columns in Table 3 are not identical, but they are similar. In this sense, the data
appear to be consistent with the notion that joint bidding negotiations in an area
do not diﬀerentially aﬀect contemporaneous bidding behavior outside that area. (We
should mention a caveat: This conclusion ignores any bias arising from the propensity
to be categorized as a potential bidder, by our measure.)
Hendricks and Porter [14] describe an analogous measurement exercise, using a
diﬀerent deﬁnition of tracts in a common area, based on clusters of adjacent tracts.
(A slightly diﬀerent sample was used as well, 1954-1975.) For pairs of the seven most
frequent bidders, bivariate probit regressions to explain whether either or both of
27the ﬁrms bid on individual tracts were estimated for two types of clusters without
joint bids by the pair; those in sales with contemporaneous joint bids by the pair,
and those in sales without. The bivariate probit regressions included sale speciﬁc
dummy variables, as well as some tract and cluster speciﬁc variables (logarithm of
the winning bid, number of other bids submitted, number of tracts in the cluster,
etc.). The bivariate probit regressions were calculated separately for each ﬁrm pair.
The estimated correlation coeﬃcient of the errors did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly across
the two types of clusters, for almost every pair of ﬁrms. This is consistent with
the evidence presented in Tables 2 and 3. Interestingly, the estimated correlation
coeﬃcients was signiﬁcantly lower for many pairs of ﬁrms for the period 1976-1984,
following the ban on joint bids among these ﬁrms. This pattern is consistent with
the ﬁrms establishing a pattern of geographic specialization, perhaps as a substitute
for joint bidding.
7.2 Joint Bidding Patterns
We now examine the incidence of Big12 joint bids, and argue that it is consistent
with our theoretical model.
Tables 4a and 4b provide summary statistics on the tracts in our sample. In Table
4a, the tracts are classiﬁed by the number of potential Big12 bidders, which ranges
from 0 to 12. In Table 4b, the classiﬁcation is according to the number of Big10
bidders. Recall that the Big10 consists of the Big12 less Shell and Forest. Recall also
that our count of potential bidders includes only Big12 ﬁrms, and there is potential
competition from fringe ﬁr m se v e nw h e naﬁrm knows it is the only large potential
bidder (i.e.,  t =1 ). For each value of  t, the second column gives the number of
tracts, and the third gives the mean high bid. The mean high bid increases from
$434 thousand on tracts where none of the Big12 ﬁrms are potential bidders to $21.8
million on tracts where every Big12 ﬁrm is a potential bidder. The mean high bid in
the sample is $6.2 million per tract. (Bids are expressed in 1982 dollars.) Ex ante
expectations, as measured by the high bid, are positively correlated with  t.
T h el a s tt h r e ec o l u m n sr e p o r tt h ea v e r a g en u m b e ro fb i d sp e rt r a c t ,t h ep r o p o r t i o n
of those bids submitted by Big12 or Big10 ﬁrms, and the proportion of Big12 or
Big10 bids that are joint. Big12 ﬁrms submit 73.8% of all bids, and this proportion
is roughly constant in  t. Since the number of bids per tract is increasing in  t,t h e
average number of bids by fringe ﬁrms increases with  t. On average, there is less
than one fringe bid.
The ﬁnal columns of Tables 4a and 4b reveal that the proportion of Big12 or Big10
bids that are joint is also increasing in  t, the number of potential large bidders. Since
Shell and Forest rarely participate in joint bids, the Big10 numbers are more relevant
for this comparison. In particular, the proportion of bids that are joint is increasing
28in  t for small numbers of potential large bidders, and roughly constant in  t when
 t > 4. It is notable that there are few joint bids when  t is 2, 3 or 4.
The theory predicts that joint ventures are less likely to form when ﬁrms have
relatively pessimistic priors. To the extent that  t is an indicator of prior expectations,
the patterns of joint bidding incidence are consistent with the theoretical prediction.
In the instances when there are between two and four potential Big10 bidders, one
can also compare Big10 joint bidding incidence according to whether Shell was also a
potential bidder. The idea is that ﬁrms have more optimistic priors on tracts where
Shell is a potential bidder. The Big10 bidders also face more potential competition
on these tracts. Of the 361 tracts with 2 to 4 potential Big10 bidders, Shell was also
a potential bidder on 148 of them. The Big10 ﬁrms submitted 164 bids on this subset,
of which 29.5% were joint. In contrast, in the remaining 213 tracts where Shell was
not a potential bidder, only 9.5% of the Big10 bids submitted were joint. Again, this
pattern is consistent with the preceding theoretical model.
Another possible explanation for the pattern is that Big 10 ﬁrms who are more
likely to bid jointly may have been less likely to bid on low   tracts. However, the
data did not support this hypothesis.
We have so far ignored the role of the government decision to reject the high bid.
It is conceivable that ﬁrms do not submit joint bids on tracts with few potential
bidders. They may be concerned that their bid will be rejected, if the government
reacts to the absence of competition. As Porter [26] notes, high wildcat bids were
much more likely to be rejected when there were relatively few bids, and when these
bids were low. However, only three high joint bids were rejected in our sample, out
of 167 high joint bids, or 1.8%, as opposed to 7.9% of high solo bids. When one
conditions on the level of the high bid, the rejection rule appears to favor joint bids,
if anything. (Of course, this does not prove that, had more joint bids been submitted,
they would have been accepted with the same frequency.)
8C o n c l u s i o n
We have shown that the trading ineﬃciency caused by the “winner’s curse” can be
an important obstacle to collusion in auctions of common value assets with a binding
reserve price or ex post investment. The theory predicts that buyers are unlikely to
collude when investment costs are substantial, the number of buyers is small, and
priors are relatively pessimistic. These conditions are satisﬁed in the auctions of
federal oﬀshore oil and gas leases on marginal tracts. As our theory predicts, joint
bids were less prevalent on these tracts, even though the relative gains from colluding
were large, since there was less competition and information sharing was valuable.
An alternative explanation of the patterns in the data was provided in Hendricks
29and Porter [14]. In that paper, our focus was on pre-sale investments necessary for
entry as a serious bidder. If rivals cannot observe when these investments are made,
free riding is an obstacle to cartel formation. We analyzed a simple environment
in which pre-sale investments were zero/one decisions, cartel formation was a veto
game in which ﬁrms simultaneously announced whether they intended to join (and the
cartel formed if and only if all ﬁrms said "yes"), and the seller’s auction had a binding
reserve price with pure common values. In the equilibrium of the three stage game,
the incidence of cartel formation is also positively correlated with ex ante perceptions
of tract value. The intuition is that ﬁrms are willing to participate in a joint bid when
they are relatively certain that their rivals are informed, and hence likely to bid in the
seller’s auction, and this situation is more likely to occur in areas that are perceived
to be valuable. We discount this alternative explanation for two reasons. First, as
noted in footnote 8, equilibria in which the cartel does not form because both ﬁrms
announce "no" are not renegotiation-proof. Second, the institutional description in
Section 2 suggests that ﬁrms do observe whether rivals participate in the ﬁrst stage
group shoot. More generally, they could verify whether a rival had made the requisite
investments prior to joint bidding negotiations.
Our results are for legal cartels. However, the analysis may also prove useful
for understanding self-enforcing cartels. Athey and Bagwell [1, 2] study optimal
collusion in markets where ﬁrms receive privately-observed, i.i.d. cost shocks. The
ﬁrms can communicate with each other to determine who has the lowest cost but they
cannot make side-payments to each other. Their modeling approach is to recast the
repeated, hidden information game as a static mechanism, similar to that analyzed in
the legal cartel literature. They show that, if ﬁrms are suﬃciently patient, they can
use “market share favors” to implement eﬃcient collusion. Our results suggest that
i tm a yb em o r ed i ﬃcult to collude if cost shocks contain a common component.
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33Appendix A
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 :
Aﬃliation implies that f2(t|s)/f(t|s) is increasing in t and that f(t|s)/F(t|s) is
























P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :

















































34Equilibrium proﬁts to a buyer with signal s>bin a ﬁrst-price knockout auction














































































P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 :
Equilibrium proﬁts to a buyer with signal s>ain a ﬁrst-price knockout auction
without information pooling is





























































where the second term on the right-hand side is positive since w(s,t) is increasing in








P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 :
Eﬃciency implies that Q1(s1,s 2)=1if s1 >band s1 >s 2 >θ (s1) and equal to 0














36for s ≥ b,w h e r eπ10 is a constant. Changing integration order in the above expression
yields









The proﬁt expression for buyer 2 can be derived symmetrically.
From (5),
π1(s)=Et[Q1(s,t)max{w(s,t) − r, 0}]+EtP1(s,t).
It follows that
EtP1(s,t)=π1(s) − K(s)















[w(t,t) − r][1 − F(t)]dF(t).
Ex ante budget balance implies E(s,t){P1(s,t)+P2(t,s)} =0 . It follows that
π10 + π20 =2
Z 1
b
[w(t,t) − r][1 − F(t)]dF(t).
Proof of Proposition 10:
F i r s tn o t i c et h a tt h ep r o ﬁt for a buyer with signal s from the seller’s auction,








On the other hand, by Theorem 1, the proﬁt for a bidder with signal s from an
eﬃcient, incentive ring mechanism, πC(s), is a positive constant when s ≤ b,a n d














Therefore, πC(s) ≥ πNC(s),∀s ∈ [0,1] if and only if πC(1) ≥ πNC(1).T h e c l a i m
follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 11:
Let
u1(s, ˜ s)=Et[max[w(s,t) − r,0]Q1(˜ s,t) − P1(˜ s,t)]
and
u1(s)=u1(s,s).
u2(t) and u2(t,˜ t) are similarly deﬁned. An allocation mechanism [Qi,P i] is incentive
compatible if and only if
u1(s, ˜ s) ≤ u1(s)
and
u2(t,˜ t) ≤ u2(t)
for all s,t, ˜ s,˜ t ∈ [0,1].L e tM be the set of incentive compatible and ex ante budget













1/2, if s = t
0, otherwise
Q2(t,s)=1− Q1(s,t).
Let Ω(s)={t|w(s,t) ≥ r} and ¯ Ω = {(s,t)|w(s,t) ≥ r}. Then necessary and











w1(s,t)Q1(˜ s,t)dF(t) weakly increases with ˜ s
38for buyer 1 and similar conditions for buyer 2.
Since
Q1(s,t)+Q2(t,s)=1 ,
























u1(s)=Et[max[w(s,t) − r, 0]Q(s,t) − P1(s,t)],
it follows that





















Ex ante budget balance requires that
0=Es,tP1(s,t)+Es,tP1(s,t)
= −u01 − u02 +
Z
¯ Ω
(I(t,s)+[ I(s,t) − I(t,s)]Q(s,t))dFdF.
It follows that
u01 + u02 =
Z
¯ Ω
(I(t,s)+[ I(s,t) − I(t,s)]Q(s,t))dFdF.
39Thus,
u1(1) + u2(1) =
Z
¯ Ω
































It follows from the assumption that J(s,t)−J(t,s) ≥ 0 if and only if s ≥ t. Therefore,
u1(1) + u2(1) is maximized in M when the eﬃcient allocation rule is used.
Since the ﬁrst-price knockout auction implements the eﬃcient allocation rule, to
check whether the interim participation constraints are violated it is without loss
of generality to compare the payoﬀ f r o mt h ek n o c k o u ta u c t i o na n dt h a tf r o mt h e
competitive bidding at the highest signal. The claim follows. Q.E.D.
40Appendix B
In this appendix, we present the expressions for payoﬀs and cutoﬀ points used in
Section 5.
B1. Status Quo Mechanism with Two Buyers
The cutoﬀ point in the status quo mechanism can be calculated as follows: a2 =0















for s ≥ a2 and zero otherwise.
B2. Knockout Auction with Two Buyers









(2x + µ − r)dx
q




(2x + µ − r)(1 − x
q)dx
q
and θ(s)=m a x {r − µ − s,0}.N o t et h a t
π
K(1) = π0 +
Z 1
θ(1)



























41The second term in the equation for πK(1) can be expressed as
Z 1
θ(1)
(1 + x + µ − r)dx








and the third term can be expressed as
Z 1
b2
(2x + µ − r)dx














Putting the terms together yields
π
K(1) =
2q2 +2 q +1














B3. Equal Sharing Mechanism with Two Buyers







(s + x + µ − r)dx
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for all s ∈ [θ(1),1] and 0 otherwise.
B4. Status Quo Mechanism with Three Buyers
Deﬁne
w(s,t)=E[s1 + s2 + s3|s1 = s, max{s2,s 3} = t].
In the status quo mechanism, it can be veriﬁed that there is a symmetric equilibrium







































Note that a3 >a 2 if and only if r<(1+3q)/(1+q).I fr ≥ (1+3q)/(1+q) then
a2 = a3 =1 .
B5. Knockout Auction with Three Buyers
To determine the cartel payoﬀs, deﬁne
¯ w(s,t)=E[max[0,s 1 + s2 + s3 − r]|s1 = s, max{s2,s 3} = t].








































max{s + t + x − r,0}dx
q/t
q.









t − r +
(r − s − t)1+q
(1 + q)tq .
If s +2 t<r ,t h e n¯ w(s,t)=0 .
Since the slope of the cartel payoﬀ is zero when ¯ w(s,t)=0for all t ≤ s, it follows
that b3 = r/3.N o t et h a tb3 <b 2 if and only if r>3µ. Moreover, since












Wildcat Bidding by the Twelve Most Active Firms  













Arco/Getty/Cities/Cont. 437 114 105  551
Standard Oil of California 408 76 76  484
Standard Oil of Indiana  132 276 257  408
Shell Oil  444 3 3  447
Gulf Oil  201 81 48  282
Exxon 325 42 35  367
Texaco 114 178 148  292
Mobil 48 163 134  211
Union Oil of California  95 201 157  296
Phillips 98 65 62  163
Sun Oil  241 93 69  334
Forest 195 0 0  195
  
Total 2738 625 559  3363
                                                        
 




 Table 2 
 
Big10 Pair Bidding with 2-4 Potential Big10 Bidders 
 
  Joint Bid in 
Area 




# of Tracts  198  2,146  13,901 
No Bid  96  1,545  10,003 
  48.5% 72.0% 72.0% 
Solo 12  569  3,662 
 6.1%  26.5%  26.3% 
Compete 0  32  236 
  1.5%  1.7% 
JB2 63  0  0 
 31.8%    
JB3 27  0  0 
 13.6%    
 Table 3 
 
Big10 Pair Bidding with 5-10 Potential Big10 Bidders 
 
  Joint Bid in 
Area 




# of Tracts  1,780  2,777  28,383 
No Bid  727  1,281  12,401 
  40.8% 46.1% 43.7% 
Solo 322  1,071  10,991 
  18.1% 38.6% 38.7% 
Compete 67  425  4,991 
 3.8%  15.3%  17.6% 
JB2 493 0  0 
 27.7%    
JB3 171 0  0 





 Table 4a 
Bidding Behavior Conditional on Level of Big 12 Competition 
 
      Bids per Big 12 Bids Joint Big12  
NPot12  Tracts  Mean High Bid  Tract  All Bids  All Big 12 
0  14   $         434,425  1.21 0.0% NA 
1  110   $      1,480,887  1.23 74.8% 0.0% 
2  74   $      2,315,983  1.69 69.6% 3.4% 
3  130   $      2,360,185  1.92 80.3% 8.0% 
4  136   $      2,936,417  2.32 70.3% 14.0% 
5  70   $      4,011,824  2.47 76.9% 16.5% 
6  52   $      4,502,450  3.42 82.6% 19.7% 
7  77   $      5,451,971  4.03 71.6% 18.0% 
8  159   $      5,936,896  3.49 78.9% 19.4% 
9  132   $      8,007,384  4.42 73.8% 20.5% 
10  128   $      9,136,267  5.75 75.3% 20.6% 
11  113   $    10,487,946  5.68 73.5% 23.5% 
12  65   $    21,815,490  8.32 66.0% 24.1% 
          
6.47  1260   $      6,154,622  3.62 73.8% 18.6% Table 4b 
Bidding Behavior Conditional on Level of Big 10 Competition 
      Bids  Big 10 Bids  Joint Big 10 
NPot10  Tracts  Mean High Bid  Tract  All Bids  All Big 10 
0  45   $         877,014   1.27 0.0% NA 
1  122   $      1,847,792   1.42 54.9% 0.0% 
2  85   $      2,479,667   1.84 60.3% 7.4% 
3  180   $      2,552,783   2.02 59.8% 16.6% 
4  96   $      3,852,841   2.77 59.8% 18.2% 
5  73   $      5,374,535   3.70 58.1% 23.6% 
6  101   $      4,783,250   3.52 56.2% 24.0% 
7  144   $      6,642,102   3.95 61.9% 22.4% 
8  139   $      8,483,068   5.11 60.8% 27.1% 
9  165   $      9,254,145   5.08 62.9% 25.8% 
10  110   $    17,379,913   7.28 61.2% 27.1% 
          
5.47  1260   $      6,154,622   3.62 59.7% 22.8% 
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